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HOW THE QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS AFFECTS
TECHNOLOGICAL DEEPENING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
This paper assesses the effect of institutional quality on R&D expenditures in
developing countries.  The paper finds that the risk of expropriation and the rule of law
are correlated with R&D expenditures.  Since both institutional variables increase as
institutional quality improves (i.e., as risk of expropriation decreases and rule of law
improves), this suggests that stronger institutions encourage greater R&D expenditures.
The result for the risk of expropriation is more highly significant and far more robust than
the result for the ‘rule of law’.  Although R&D is not the primary way that developing
countries gain access to technology, this result is interesting for at least two reasons.
First, R&D might encourage technological deepening better than other methods that
developing countries use to gain access to technology (e.g., through FDI or capital goods
imports).  Second, past work has shown that another important way that developing
countries gain access to technology, through FDI, is also positively correlated with
institutional quality (i.e., as institutional quality improves, FDI increases).2
1.  INTRODUCTION
Acquiring new technology is not simply a matter of purchasing new machinery or
product designs.  Learning how to use and adapt technologies to local circumstances and
imitating existing products and processes takes considerable effort.
1  In a study of U.S.
firms, Mansfield et al. (1981) find that imitating new products is especially costly when
imitating firms have less ‘know-how’ than the innovating firm has.  Enterprises in
developing countries, trying to imitate technologies or ideas imported from developed
countries, are likely to suffer from this kind of knowledge gap.  In addition, the large
institutional and economic differences between developed and developing countries mean
that, in many cases, enterprises will benefit from adapting, and improving, technologies
to local circumstances rather than imitating products and processes directly.  Some ways
of acquiring technology, e.g., investment in local research and development (R&D) or
licensing, might increase an enterprise’s ability to adapt and improve technologies better
than others, e.g., Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  Therefore, even though R&D is
probably not the primary way that enterprises in developing countries acquire
technologies, factors that affect local R&D expenditures might be of interest, if R&D
encourages technological deepening.  This paper studies whether one particular factor,
institutional quality, affects R&D expenditures in developing countries.
In general, since returns to R&D will often be spread over several years, firms
will need significant periods to recover expenditures.  If firms and individuals are unsure
about the institutional environment, they might be unwilling to commit the necessary
funds to R&D.  Although this is true for all medium and long-term investment, because
‘ideas’ are non-rivalous, they are probably more at risk from expropriation than other
forms of investment.  Keefer and Knack (1997) write:
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 Several authors, including Bell and Pavitt (1986), make this point in reference to developing countries.  In a study of U.S. firms,
Mansfield et al. (1981) finds that, on average, it cost imitating firms 65% of the cost of innovation to imitate new products.  In one
seventh of the cases, imitation costs were at least as high as innovation costs.  Mansfield et al (1981) suggest ‘this was not due to any
superiority of the imitative product over the innovation.  Instead, in a substantial percentage of these cases, it was due to the
innovator’s having a technological edge over its rivals in the relevant field.  They also found that although patents increased the cost
of imitation, the median estimated increase was only 11%.3
“More secure property right and credible policy regimes increase the
incentives of entrepreneurs to adopt those techniques that maximize long-
run profits.  Firms make less efficient adjustments and continue to use
obsolescent technology if those policies are not credible, or if optimal firm
adjustments leave them more vulnerable to expropriation.”  (p. 591)
This paper finds that expenditures on R&D tend to be lower in countries where the risk of
expropriation is higher and the rule of law is weaker.  This confirms the importance of
institutional quality on technological innovation and is consistent with the cross-country
analysis in Knack and Keefer (1995) that finds that long-run growth is significantly
correlated with similar measures of institutional quality.
Although FDI, rather than R&D is probably the primary way that enterprises in
developing countries acquire technology, this study adds to existing work in several
ways.
2  First, expenditures on R&D are one way that developing countries increase
technological depth.
3  Other methods of acquiring technology, such as FDI, might be less
successful in this regard.  Second, it complements other studies (e.g., Gastanaga et al.,
1998, and Lee and Mansfield, 1996) that have shown that foreign direct investment (FDI)
is also positively correlated with institutional quality.
4
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses the data used in the
analysis.  Section 3 describes the empirical results.  Section 4 conducts some sensitivity
analysis and Section 5 concludes.
2.  FACTORS AFFECTING R&D EXPENDITURES
To study the cross-country correlation between expenditures on research and
development (R&D) in developing countries and measures of institutional development,
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  See, for example, World Bank (1998).
3
  Although, expenditures on R&D are an input to technological deepening (rather than a measure of output), it is probably better
measured than output variables such as patents, especially in countries with weak protection of intellectual property.
4
 Wei (1999) shows that foreign direct investment is negatively correlated with corruption, which tends to be negatively correlated
with measures of institutional quality (see Knack and Keefer, 1995).4
we assemble a panel of data from low and middle-income countries.
5  Panel data are well
suited to exploring the relationship between R&D expenditures and other economic
variables for several reasons.  Including fixed effects will help to control for omitted
country characteristics (that are roughly constant over time) that might be correlated with
both R&D expenditures and the independent variables.  This might also help to partially
control for different measurement methods used for R&D in different sample countries.
6
In addition to the institutional variables, additional variables are included to control for
other possible factors that might affect R&D Expenditures.  Means, standard deviations
and sources of data are shown in Table 1.
Institutional Development.
The variables we use for institutional quality are ‘risk of expropriation’ and ‘rule
of law’, two measures used by Knack and Keefer (1995) to proxy for the security of
property and contract rights.  These measures are produced by the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG), a private international investment risk service.  The first indicator
measures the risk of confiscation or forced nationalization, and the second measures the
degree to which established institutions make and enforce laws and adjudicate disputes.
For both measures, higher values indicate stronger institutions.
7  For example, high
values for ‘risk of expropriation’ indicate that nationalization or confiscation is less, not
more, likely.  In this study, ‘risk of expropriation’ is intended as a general measure of the
security of property rights.  Governments that are more willing to confiscate property are
probably also less likely to respect private property rights in disputes between private
parties.  These measures are highly correlated with other measures of weak property
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 Middle-income countries have per capita income (for that particular year) between US$500 and $6000 in constant 1987 dollars and
low-income countries have per capita income (for that particular year) of less than US$500.  These cutoff points are the points used in
the 1989 World Development Report (World Bank, 1989).
6
  Although the dependent variable might be badly measured, it is not clear that this will have a large impact on results.  Unlike
measurement error in independent variables, measurement error in the dependent variable does not bias parameter estimates, unless
the measurement error is systematically correlated with the independent variables.  That is, the measurement error can be absorbed
into the disturbance term for the regression.
7
   See Knack and Keefer (1995, p.225-226) for more complete descriptions of these variables.5
rights, such as the level of corruption.
8  Keefer and Knack (1995) note that since private
investors are willing to pay substantial amounts for these indices, they presumably
contain some information.
Per Capita Income
World Bank (1998) notes that R&D expenditures in low and middle-income
countries tend to be lower than expenditures in industrial countries (in both absolute
terms and relative to GDP).  For example, in this sample, mean R&D expenditures in
high-income industrial countries in 1994 was 1.8% of GDP compared to 0.8% in low and
middle-income countries.
9  This could be because other explanatory variable that vary
systematically with income also affect R&D expenditures.  For example, wealthier
countries tend to have higher levels of human capital, which is presumably an important
input for R&D, and stronger institutions, which might affect individuals’ or firms’
willingness to invest in long-term projects (such as R&D investments).
10  Although we
include measures of institutional quality and human capital in the base regression, per
capita income might capture other effects and help control for omitted variables.  Per
capita income squared is also included in the base regression to allow for a possible non-
linear effect.
Human capital.
Human capital and the educational ability of the populace are likely to affect
technological capability and R&D expenditures.  As Romer (1992) points out, although
that there is a distinction between the pure private good, human capital, and the non-
rivalous good ‘ideas’, it is clear that the two are closely linked.  A country’s endowment
of human capital might affect R&D expenditures in several ways.  First, countries with
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  See Knack and Keefer (1995, footnote 9).  The link between corruption and growth is discussed in Mauro (1995).
9
 This is the last sample year for which a large number of observations is available.  The high-income industrial countries are
Australia, Austria, Canada, Spain, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore and the United States.  The low and middle-income
countries are Argentina, Bulgaria, Brazil, Belarus, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Iran, Korea, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic and Turkey.
10
   For the correlation between institutional quality and per capita GDP, see Keefer and Knack (1997), Table 1.6
high levels of human capital might have a comparative advantage in R&D – it is
generally accepted that R&D uses highly trained individuals, such as scientists and
engineers, intensively.  Second, a large share of R&D activity is performed in universities
and, therefore, countries that invest heavily in tertiary education might have higher R&D
expenditures.
11  Finally, studies of R&D in the United States have found that
geographical proximity is important for local innovation.
12 It is plausible that proximity
might also be important for innovation in middle-income countries, especially
considering that the poor infrastructure might make long-distance communication
problematic in developing countries.  Therefore, expenditures on universities might also
encourage R&D in local enterprises.
Development of Capital Markets.
Access to capital might also effect private enterprises’ ability to finance research
and development.  This has been a practical concern for policy-makers.  World Bank
(1995), which summarizes World Bank experience with loans for industrial technological
development, notes that five of the six projects surveyed included components that
provided finance for technological activities.  Although financial intermediaries might
directly finance only a small portion of innovative activity, King and Levine (1993, p.
517) note that they can increase the returns to innovative activity by helping
entrepreneurs bring successful ideas to the market.  Well functioning financial markets
will, therefore, increase the return to research and development even if they do not
directly finance investment in R&D.  In this paper, we use one of the main variables from
King and Levine (1993) as a proxy for financial market development – bank credit to
private enterprises as a share of GDP (p. 529).  Financial systems that allocate large
portions of bank credit to private enterprises – rather than to the government or to public
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  Several studies (e.g., Dahlman et al., 1987) advise that government funded basic research might not be justified in developing
countries.  They suggest “research institutes can get on tracks that do little for a country’s productivity and efficiency.  There is,
moreover, much more scope in developing countries for applied rather than basic research…”(p.774).  In contrast, other studies (e.g.,
Bell and Pavitt, 1993) suggest that “the main economic benefit of basic research is not published information, but a supply of
scientists and engineers with problem solving skills, familiarity with research methodologies and instrumentation, and membership in
informal and international networks of professional peers. (p. 271)7
enterprises – are likely to have more experience in evaluating potentially successful
innovations.  This variable, which reflects the development of the banking sector, seems
to capture the concept that we are interested in quite well.
Openness to Trade and Investment
In addition to the other economic variables, we also include several measures of
openness to foreign trade and investment.  Dahlman (1994) notes that access to foreign
capital, either through foreign investment or through capital goods imports, might be an
important way of acquiring technology in developing countries.  The effect on R&D
expenditures is, therefore, ambiguous since openness may serve as a substitute for
domestic innovation.  In addition, FDI might crowd out domestic R&D if FDI uses
similar inputs to R&D, and these inputs take time to build (e.g., experienced engineers
and scientists).  The degree of substitution is of interest, because although openness
might be an effective way of acquiring technology, it might be a less effective way to
increase technological depth.  For example, World Bank (1995) suggests:
“A heavy reliance on foreign direct investment can be an extremely
effective method of transferring operational know-how of new
technologies, and can have numerous beneficial externalities.  It may not,
however, be the best way to promote technological deepening
The measures of openness to trade that we use are imports and exports as share of
GDP and the black market premium.  The first measure is a direct measure of the
importance of imports and exports.  The inclusion of fixed effects makes this measure
somewhat similar to measures of structural adjusted trade intensity (see Pritchett, 1996).
Since many factors that affect trade intensity (e.g., population, size of the economy, and
natural resource endowments) do not change greatly over short periods, these effects will
be partially controlled for by the inclusion of country dummies.  That is, once fixed
effects are included in the regression, this variable measures the deviation from the
(country-specific) mean level of imports and exports.  The second measure of trade
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 See Jaffe (1989) and Audretsch and Feldman (1996).  Audretsch and Stephan (1996) finds although that geographical proximity
appears to matter, it is less important in establishing formal ties than informal ties.8
policy is the black market exchange rate premium.  However, although studies have used
this as a measure of trade policy, Pritchett (1996, p. 314) notes that it has also been used
as a measure of macroeconomic stability, economic freedom and exchange rate
overvaluation.  The final measure of openness is openness to investment, rather than
trade.  The indicator used is net incoming FDI.
Government and Defense Expenditures
Government expenditures might affect R&D expenditures in several ways.  First,
governments directly fund significant amounts of research in universities, research
laboratories and even private enterprises, in both developed and in developing countries.
Further, if geographical spillovers are important, then government-funded research might
also increase R&D expenditures by local firms.  For these reasons, if total government
expenditures are correlated with government expenditures on R&D, we might expect
government expenditures to be correlated with R&D expenditures.  However, if
government R&D expenditures displace private expenditures – either by using scarce
human and physical resources or because private enterprises use government research to
replace their own efforts – then it might have little effect on total R&D.  Further, high
taxes might discourage private R&D, especially if enterprises are unable to depreciate
R&D investment in the same way as other investment.  This could lead to a negative
correlation between government expenditures and R&D expenditures.  In addition to total
government expenditure, we also include defense expenditures in the base regression.  In
many countries, significant amounts of government sponsored R&D are, directly or
indirectly, for defense-related purposes.
13  For this reason, we might expect defense
expenditures to be significantly correlated with R&D expenditures.
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 Ram (1995) notes that empirical work on defense expenditures and growth suggests that defense expenditures do not appear
robustly correlated with economic growth.  He suggests that this might be due to offsetting effects from externalities (perhaps due to
the effect of defense expenditures on human capital formation or technological progress) and resource diversion.9
3.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The data used in the empirical section are annual data from between 1983 and
1994.  Since multiple observations are available over this period, we essentially have an
(unbalanced) panel.  Fixed country and time effects are included in all regressions, in
addition to the other independent variables discussed above.  This, essentially, means that
all variables are demeaned using individual country means.  Consequently, there are no
‘high’ or ‘low’ investment countries in the sample.  Including fixed effects has several
distinct advantages over simple ordinary least squares:
1.  Including fixed effects in the regression helps to control for omitted variables that are
(more or less) constant over the period.  For example, some countries might have a
tradition of engaging in scientific research or a large stock of human capital
specialized in R&D.
2.  It is possible that the definition of R&D expenditures varies systematically across
countries.  However, if the definitions used by individual countries are (more or less)
constant over time, then fixed effects might partially control for these differences.
Another concern is the direction of causality for some of the economic variables
and, to a lesser extent, the institutional variables.  For example, differences in R&D
expenditures might alter the pattern of imports and exports in the medium or long-term.
However, R&D expenditures are likely to take several years to influence economic and
institutional variables, and, therefore, this might not be a major concern.  We lag the
economic and institutional variables by one year to further minimize this risk.  Given the
delayed influence of R&D expenditures on the other variables, the inclusion of fixed
effects might be especially helpful.  That is, once fixed effects are included in the
regression we are considering, for example, whether R&D expenditures were increasing
(relative to the country-specific mean) in those countries where institutional quality was
improving (relative to the country-specific mean), not whether R&D expenditures are
high in those countries with strong institutions.  A similar argument applies to the
economic variables.10
Table 3 shows the results from fixed effects regressions for middle and low-
income countries.  Column (1) shows the results from a regression that includes all of the
economic and institutional variables.  When both rule of law and risk of expropriation are
included in the regression, both variables are statistically significant at conventional 5%
or 10% levels.  However, the coefficient on the risk of expropriation tends to be more
highly significant throughout the empirical analysis.  The positive coefficients are
consistent with the hypothesis that greater protection of property rights and stronger
institutions are correlated with greater expenditure on R&D.  Given the high correlation
between these two institutional variables (0.76 in the sample of middle and low-income
countries), there might be a problem with multicollinearity.  Columns (3) and (5) show
similar regressions with the risk of expropriation and the rule of law omitted.  The results
in column (3) are almost identical to the results in column (1).  Omitting the risk of
expropriation variable from the regression increases neither the magnitude nor the
significance of the rule of law variable (see column 5).
Several of the economic control variables are also statistically significant.  Higher
per capita GDP is correlated with higher R&D expenditures after controlling for the other
institutional and economic variables.  This positive, and statistically significant,
correlation remains throughout the analysis.  Consistent with the hypothesis that human
capital is positively correlated with R&D expenditures, the primary enrollment rate is
positively correlated with R&D expenditures.  However, the tertiary enrollment rate is
statistically insignificant and the observed correlation between the primary enrollment
rate and R&D expenditures is not highly robust.  Once the statistically insignificant
control variables are dropped, the coefficient on the primary enrollment rate becomes
insignificant.  Claims on the private sector by deposit money banks and the central bank
is not significantly correlated with R&D expenditures in any of the regressions for low
and middle-income countries.  One of the measures of openness, incoming FDI, is
significantly negatively correlated with R&D expenditures.  This result appears quite
strong – it is robust to changes in the sample (see Table 3, Columns 7-12) and to changes
in the other control variables (see Table 3, Columns 2,4 and 6).11
The measures of openness to trade – exports and imports as a percentage of GDP
and the black market premium are not significantly correlated with the dependent
variable.  This does not seem to be due to multicollinearity, since the two variables are
also jointly insignificant at a 10% level.
14  Finally, government expenditures are
negatively correlated with R&D expenditures (at a 10% level), while defense
expenditures are positively correlated with R&D expenditures.  However, a better
measure of the correlation between defense expenditures and R&D expenditures might be
the sum of the two coefficients since most defense expenditures are government funded.
The sum is positive but statistically insignificant in the model specifications in columns
(1)-(3).
The fixed effects are highly significant in all regressions in Table 3.  We reject the
(joint) null hypothesis that the state dummies are all equal and that the time dummies are
all zero at less than a 1% level for all regressions.  The two hypotheses are also rejected
separately at similar levels of significance.  This strongly suggests that including state
and time dummies in the regression is appropriate.
In columns (7) and (8), we present results from similar regressions using a sample
that includes developed countries in addition to the developing countries.  This more than
doubles the total number of observations and nearly doubles the number of countries.
The “risk of expropriation” remains significantly, and positively, correlated with R&D
expenditures.  In addition, per capita income remains significantly and positively
correlated with R&D expenditures and the coefficient on (incoming) foreign direct
investment remains significant and negative.  The trade variables remain statistically
insignificant (singly and jointly) at conventional significance levels.  The only noticeable
changes are that the coefficient on the tertiary enrollment rate becomes statistically
significant and positive, the coefficient on the claims on private sector by deposit money
banks and the central bank becomes statistically significant, while the coefficient on
government expenditures becomes statistically insignificant and positive.  This final
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 Further, these two measures are not significantly correlated with each other.  The low correlation between different measures of
openness is discussed in  Pritchett (1996).12
result means that the sum of the coefficients on government expenditures and defense
expenditures is positive and statistically significant.  Overall, the results are similar to the
results for the smaller sample of low and middle-income countries.
In columns (9) and (10), we drop low-income countries (less than $600 per capita
in 1987 US$).  This reduces the number of observations and the number of countries
slightly.  However, the results are broadly similar to the results for the two other
subsamples: the coefficient on the risk of expropriation remains highly significant, as
does the coefficient on openness to foreign direct investment.  Further, the coefficient on
the two other openness variables remains statistically insignificant (jointly and singly).
Finally, columns (11) and (12) drop the transition economies of Europe and Central Asia
from the regression.  This reduces the degrees of freedom and the number of countries
more significantly.  Given the low number of observations and countries that remain after
dropping these countries, it is probably reasonable to treat these results with some level
of caution.  The significance level of the coefficient on the risk of expropriation remains
negative but becomes smaller in absolute value and falls to a 10% significance level.  The
coefficient on the openness to foreign direct investment remains similar in terms of
statistical significance and sign, although it does become smaller in absolute value.  The
coefficients on government expenditures and defense expenditures also become
statistically insignificant at conventional levels.  The other significant change is that once
these observations are dropped for the regression, the coefficients on the two openness
variables become negative and statistically significant at, at least, a 10% level.  This
suggests that, for these countries, increased openness is correlated with lower R&D
expenditures.  However, as noted above, these results should be treated with caution
considering the small number of observations and countries in this sample.
In summary, several results from this section appear to be robust across different
samples and different sets of control variables.  The institutional variables are positively
correlated with R&D expenditures.  Since both variables increase as institutional quality
improves (i.e., as risk of expropriation decreases and rule of law improves) this suggests
that stronger institutions are, in general, correlated with greater R&D expenditures.  The
result for the risk of expropriation is more highly significant and far more robust.13
Second, after controlling for the other economic and institutional variables, per capita
income remains positively correlated with R&D expenditures.  Third, two of the
measures of openness are, in general, uncorrelated with R&D expenditures while the
third, incoming FDI is negatively correlated with R&D expenditures.  The last result
appears highly robust to different model specifications.  Finally, government
expenditures tend to the negatively correlated with R&D expenditures, while defense
expenditures tend to be positively correlated with R&D expenditures.  The sum of the
two coefficients, which would be the coefficient on government-funded defense
expenditures, is statistically insignificant in some, but not all, specifications.
4.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS.
One reasonable concern is that the results presented in the previous section might
prove to be highly sensitive to the inclusion, or exclusion, of other variables – a problem
in many areas of applied economics.  To counter this, in the context of cross-country
growth regressions, Levine and Renelt (1992) propose a test based upon Leamer’s (1983)
extreme bounds analysis (EBA).
15  Essentially, they propose running the regression with
many different combinations of variables and noting whether the coefficient on the
variable of interest is affected by the choice of other regressors.  Levine and Renelt
(1992) divide the independent regressors into three distinct groups: the I, or included
variables; the M variable, the variable of interest; and Z variables which are only
included in some specifications of the model.
16
(1) RD I M Zu im z & =+ + + β β β
The I variables are included in all specifications of the model, as is the M
variable, the variable of interest.  The Z variables, a large pool of variables that might
affect aggregate R&D expenditures, are systematically added and removed from the base
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 See McAleer et al. (1985) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) for critiques of this methodology.  For a response to McAleer et al (1985) see
Leamer (1985).
16
 See Levine and Renelt (1992) for a more complete discussion of this procedure.14
regression until all possible combinations of Z variables have been included.  After each
iteration, the researcher notes the coefficient on the M variable, β m, and its standard error.
The highest and lowest values of β m that would be accepted at a given significance level
are then computed for each set of Z variables and compared.  The β m with the highest
acceptable β  associated with it becomes the upper extreme bound and the β m with the
lowest acceptable β  associated with it becomes the lower extreme bound.  If the extreme
bounds have the same sign (and are both significant) Levine and Renelt (1992) call the
relationship between the dependent variable and the variable of interest ‘robust’.  If this is
not true, they label the relation as ‘fragile’.
There are several problems with this procedure.  First, omitting relevant variables
might bias results and lead to incorrect inference, while including irrelevant variables
might increases the standard errors on parameter estimates.  For these reasons, labeling a
coefficient as ‘fragile’ does not mean that the independent variable is not correlated with
dependent variable.  In response to Levine and Renelt’s (1992) finding that few variables
are robustly correlated with economic growth, Sala-i-Martin (1997) suggests:
“Another explanation is that the test is too strong for any variable to pass:
if the distribution of [β m] has some positive and some negative support,
then one is bound to find one regression for which the estimated
coefficient changes signs if enough regressions are run.  Thus, giving the
label of non-robust to all variables is all but guaranteed.”  (p. 179).
However, this procedure might convince readers that results are not highly
sensitive to changes in the conditioning information sets.  For this reason, we summarize
the results slightly differently from Levine and Renelt (1992).  We call a variable
“robust” if the point estimate remains significant (and the same sign) in all regressions.  If
the point estimates remain the same sign in all regressions, we label the result as “point
estimates positive (or negative)”.  If the point estimate switches sign, then we label the
estimate as ‘fragile’.  As noted above, fragile does not necessarily imply that the variable
is not related to R&D expenditures.  However, these results might be treated more
cautiously than results labeled ‘robust’.15
The variables of interest (M variables) that we test for robustness are the variables
that are included in reduced regression (i.e., variables included in the regression shown in
column 4 of Table 3).  The other five variables are included in all model specifications
(i.e., they are the I, or included, variables).  The other variables in the expanded
regression, which are not robust since they are insignificant in that regression (i.e., in
column 1 of Table 3), are the Z variables.
17  Table 2 summarizes the results for this the M
variables.
These results broadly confirm the results from the previous section.  Three of the
variables, the risk of expropriation, per capita income and incoming foreign direct
investment are robustly correlated with R&D expenditures.  The coefficient on
government expenditures and defense expenditures remain the same sign in all
regressions but become statistically insignificant in some model specifications.  The final
variable, the primary enrollment rate, is less robust – in some model specifications, the
coefficient actually switches sign.
5.  CONCLUSION
In summary:
1.  After controlling for other factors that might affect expenditures on research and
development in low and middle-income countries, per capita GDP remains robustly
correlated with R&D expenditures (as a percentage of GDP).  This might be because
of other omitted factors that differ systematically between countries or because lower
income countries tend to rely less on R&D for technological innovation than higher-
income countries even among low and middle-income countries.
2.  In general, countries with weaker institutions tend to have lower R&D expenditures
than countries with stronger institutions.  This result appears quite robust across
different samples and to different sets of control variables.
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 These are per capita GDP squared, tertiary enrollment rate, rule of law, claims on the private sector by the central bank and deposit
money banks, openness to trades and the black market premium.16
3.  Another robust result is the negative correlation between R&D expenditures and
foreign direct investment.  This result seemed robust across different samples and to
different sets of conditioning variables.  Since FDI is also negatively correlated with
institutional quality (Gastanaga et al., 1998), this might partially offset the effect of
institutional quality on R&D expenditures.
4.  Government expenditures were negatively correlated with R&D expenditures in
many specifications of the model.  Given the large role that the government often
plays in funding research in developing countries this result is somewhat surprising.
Defense expenditures are often positively correlated with R&D expenditures.  Since
defense expenditures are generally government-funded, the coefficient on
(government-funded) research is the sum of the coefficients on government
expenditures and defense expenditures.  This sum is zero in many model
specifications, suggesting that the two effects appear to cancel out.
5.  Measures of openness to trade were not correlated with R&D expenditures in most
model specifications.
Although other ways of acquiring new technologies (e.g., FDI) are probably more
important than expenditures on R&D, the results are suggestive for several reasons.  First,
R&D expenditures might be an important way to promote technological deepening.
Several studies have noted that acquiring technology through, for example, the purchase
of capital goods does not give enterprises the ability to adapt that technology to local
circumstances or allow them to generate incremental improvements.
18  If technological
deepening is important, these results are of immediate interest.  Second, the positive
correlation between institutional quality and R&D expenditures is of special interest
given that other studies have found that institutional quality is also positively correlated
with foreign direct investment, another way of acquiring technological expertise.  For
example, Gastanaga et al (1998) found that foreign direct investment was lower in
countries with greater bureaucratic delay and higher nationalization risk and Wei (1999)
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 See, for example, Ball and Pavitt’s (1992) discussion of production capacity and technological capabilities or Romer’s (1992)
discussion of ‘using ideas vs. producing ideas’.17
found that corruption discourages foreign direct investment.  Similarly, Lee and
Mansfield (1996) found that perceptions concerning the strength of intellectual property
rights affected both the volume and the composition of U.S. foreign direct investment.  It
seems reasonable that institutional quality will also affect other methods of acquiring
technology, such as through licensing.
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It is unlikely that the effect of institutional quality on foreign direct investment
drives the correlation between institutional quality and R&D expenditures.  First, we
control for the effect of FDI in the empirical analysis.  Second, Patel and Pavitt (1991)
note that, even among OECD countries, large firms tend to concentrate R&D
expenditures in their home countries.  It is even less likely that investors would
concentrate R&D intensive activities in developing countries, since developing countries
probably do not have a comparative advantage in these areas.  In summary, institutional
quality seems to affect the level of R&D expenditures in developing countries directly.
Since, institutional quality also affects other method of acquiring technology, such as
FDI, poor institutional quality is likely to slow technological development.  This result is
consistent with the observation in Knack and Keefer (1995) that the coefficients on
institutional variables remained significant after controlling for investment – they suggest
(p. 219) this is because the threat of expropriation discourage dynamic gains from
innovation.
The negative correlation between FDI and R&D expenditures is also robust across
many different model specifications.  One possible reason for the observed correlation is
that FDI is a substitute for R&D – enterprises that are unable to obtain technology
through foreign direct investment are forced to invest in R&D.  However, another
possibility is that FDI crowds out some R&D by consuming scarce resources (such as
trained engineers) that take time to build.
Although the negative correlation between FDI and own investment in R&D
might be worrying, it confirms, in a cross-country setting, results from case studies that
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 Dahlman (1994) discusses different ways that developing countries might acquire technological expertise.18
have suggested that FDI does not lead directly to increased domestic innovation and
technological deepening.
20 Pack and Saggi (1997, p. 89) note that the observed
preference that Japan and Korea demonstrated for licensing over direct investment might
have been because they believed that the spillover from licensing was greater than the
spillover from FDI and that this would allow “their firms to more quickly move towards
innovative R&D”.  In addition, based upon case studies of World Bank loans for
industrial technology projects, World Bank (1995) suggests:
“The deepening of industrial technological capability may also need
interventions in trade and technology regime that promote local research
activity.  Exposure to international competition and technology flows by
itself may not – as witnessed in Mexico and Korea – be sufficient for the
promotion of technological effort.”
Although the results suggest that other policy interventions might be necessary to
encourage deepening (especially if a heavy reliance on FDI discourages domestic
innovation), they do not justify steps to reduce FDI.  For example, World Bank (1995)
suggests that India’s isolation from foreign technology led to distortions that outweighed
the benefits of technological deepening, even in terms of innovative capability.
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 See, for example, Romer’s (1992) discussion of Mauritius and Taiwan or Dahlman’s (1994) discussion of newly industrialized
economies in East Asia.  Dahlman (1994) notes, comparing Korea and Taiwan with Hong Kong and Singapore that, of these countries,
the ones that are most dependent on FDI (Singapore and Hong Kong) also invest less in their own R&D.19
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Table 1: Means of Variables.
Variable Measurement Mean Std. Dev. Source
R&D Expenditures Divided by GDP 0.0127 0.0086 UNESCO
Per Capita GDP 1000s of 1987 US Dollars 8.2051 7.3977 WDI
Primary Enrollment Rate 101.8 8.4340 WDI
Tertiary Enrollment Rate 28.0 15.9 WDI
Risk of Expropriation
Scaled between 0-10.
High value means risk of expropriation is low. 8.2382 1.8791 ICRG
Rule of Law
Scaled between 0-6.
High value means rule of law is strong. 4.4425 1.5395 ICRG
Claims on Private Sector by Central and
Deposit Money Banks
% of GDP 0.5004 0.2993 IFS
Incoming Foreign Direct Investment % of GDP 1.1020 1.7328 WDI
Openness to Trade % of GDP 66.3 45.7 WDI
Black Market Premium (Natural Log)
(Difference between black market and official
exchange rates) divided by official rate 0.1859 0.4610 ICA
Government Expenditures % of GDP 15.7623 5.4922 WDI
Defense Expenditures % of GDP 3.0689 2.6335 SIPRI
Note:   WDI World Bank.  World Development Indicators.  World Bank, Washington DC.
IFS International Monetary Fund.  International Financial Statistics. International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
SIPRI SIPRI.  SIPRI Yearbook.  Oxford University Press, Oxford UK.
UNESCO UNESCO. UNESO Statistical Yearbook.  Bernan Press, Lanham MD.
ICRG International Country Risk Guide (From Knack and Keefer, 1995)
ICA International Currency Analysis, Inc.  World Currency Yearbook.  International Currency Analysis, Inc,
Brooklyn, NY
Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis for middle and low-income countries
Variable Point Est. t-stat. Other Variables Summary
High 1.3300 5.03 Per Capita GDP
2, Rule of Law, Openness
to Trade Per Capita GDP
Low 0.3842 5.06 Tertiary Enroll, Rule of Law, Claims on
Private Sector
Robust (5%)
High 0.1242 4.95 Per Capita GDP
2, Tertiary Enroll, Claims
on Private Sect or, Openness to Trade Risk of Expropriation
Low 0.0745 2.53 Tertiary Enroll, Black Market Premium
Robust (5%)
High -0.0558 -2.81 Per Capita GDP
2, Rule of Law, Openness
to Trade, Black Market Premium Incoming FDI
Low -0.0913 -5.95 Tertiary Enroll, Rule of Law, Claims on
Private Sector, Black market Premium
Robust (5%)
High 0.0120 2.64 Per Capita GDP
2, Tertiary Enroll, Rule of
Law, Claims on Private Sect or Primary Enrollment Rate
Low -0.0014 -0.25 Tertiary Enrollment Rate, Rule of Law
Fragile.
High -0.0107 -1.03 Per Capita GDP
2, Rule of Law, Openness
to Trade, Black Market Premium Government Expenditures
Low -0.0543 -5.56 Tertiary Enroll, Openness to Trade
Point Est. Negative
High 0.1427 4.82 Tertiary Enroll, Rule of Law, Openness to
Trade Defense Expenditures
Low 0.0370 1.17 Claims on Private Sector
Point Est. PositiveTable 3: Fixed Effects Regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent Variables Research and Development Expenditures
(as % of GDP)





Number of Observations 102 123 102 123 102 123 225 252 90 105 75 86
Number of Countries in Sample 26 28 26 28 26 28 50 52 22 24 19 20
Degrees of Freedom 52 76 52 77 52 52 152 182 45 63 33 48
Per Capita Income
Per Capita GDP













































































Risk of Expropriation (lagged)





















Rule of Law (lagged)
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Capital Market Development
Claims on Private Sector by Central and




























































































































R-Squared 0.979 0.960 0.978 0.960 0.972 0.952 0.979 0.956 0.982 0.965 0.979 0.972
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level
Note: All regressions include both country and time dummies.  T-statistics are in parentheses.